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COPYRIGHT OFFICE REGISTRATION OF INDUSTRIAL 
DESIGNS 
Dorothy Schradert 
I. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 
A. Statutory Provisions 
Under section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection 
exists in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.'" Section 102 further places works of authorship into seven cat-
egories, one of which includes works of art known as "pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works.,,2 The statutory definition of pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works embodies the language of the Copyright Office's former 
work of art regulations, issued in 19563 and 1959.4 The Copyright Act now 
provides that: 
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-di-
mensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and 
applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, 
globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, includ-
ing architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artis-
tic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or 
utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as 
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independ-
ently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 5 
Moreover, a useful article is defined in section 101 of the Act as "an article 
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is nor-
mally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article.' ,,6 
Thus, the design of an article having any useful function can be consid-
ered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if it incorporates artistic 
features that "can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.,,7 Consequently, only 
those articles which contain artistic features separate from the function of 
the article will enjoy copyright protection. 
t A.B., 1960, University of Southern California; J.D., 1963, Harvard University. Associ-
ate Register of Copyrights for Legal Affairs, United States Copyright Office. 
I. 17 U.S.c. § 102(a) (1988). 
2. [d. § 102(a)(5). 
3. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1956). 
4. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1959). 
5. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added). 
6. [d. (emphasis added). 
7. [d. 
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B. Continuity of the Copyrightability Standard from the Act of J 909 to the 
Act of 1976 
Clear legislative history supports the view that the copyrightability 
standard applied under the old Copyright Act,8 and clarified by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,9 is the same 
standard embodied in the new Copyright Act. The House Report concern-
ing the 1976 Copyright Act clearly expresses this point and provides a help-
ful explanation of the principal of separability in determining whether a 
utilitarian article contains copyrightable subject matter. 10 The Report 
states: "The Committee has added language to the definition of 'pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works' in an effort to make clearer the distinction 
between works of applied art protectable under the bill and industrial 
designs not subject to copyright protection." 1 1 This distinction is seen in 
the second part of the amendment which reads as follows: 
the design of a useful article ... shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic or sculptural work, only if, and only to the extent that 
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features 
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 12 
The above language articulates what is referred to as the principle of 
separability. In applying this principle, a two-dimensional "painting, draw-
ing or graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is 
printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, 
containers and the Iike."13 However, the shape of an industrial product is 
protected, only if some pictorial, graphic, or sculptural element can be 
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that product. Further-
more, if any such elements are identified, the copyright extends only to that 
element and not to the utilitarian article as a whole. 14 
II. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 
Section 5(g) of the Copyright Act of 190915 specified that works of art 
were eligible for copyright. The Copyright Office's regulations pursuant to 
the 1909 Act provided: "Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in pur-
pose and character are not subject to copyright registration, even if 
8. Title 17 US.c., in effect until December 31, 1977. 
9. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 US. 908 (1978). 
10. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1976 US. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5663. 
II. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976). 
12. rd.; see also 17 US.c. § 101 (1988). 
13. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976). 
14. For a full explanation of the principle of separability, see id. at 54-58. 
15. Act of Mar. 4,1909, ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075, 1077. 
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artistically made or ornamented."16 With only minor modification, this 
regulation remained in effect until 1948. 
The Copyright Office's regulations, which were adopted in 1948 and 
remained in effect on December 31, 1977, defined "works of art" in the fol-
lowing manner: "This class includes published or unpublished works of 
artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical or uti-
lization aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, 
and tapestries, as well as works belonging.to the fine arts, such as paintings, 
drawings, and sculpture." 17 This general definition excluded the utilitarian 
aspects of a work from copyright protection as a work of art. Also, it did 
not establish a precise test for differentiating protected artistic designs from 
nonprotected designs. 
The Copyright Office's works of art regulation was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein. 18 The Court held that a work of art did not 
lose its rightto protection under copyright law when it was incorporated in a 
utilitarian article and reproduced in a substantial number of copies. More-
over, the potential availability of design patent protection did not foreclose 
copyright protection. 
Although the Court upheld the Copyright Office's regulation, Mazer 
was interpreted by some as opening the door of copyright law to an even 
broader class of applied designs-those where function and aesthetic 
appearance tend to merge. In reaction to pressure for increased protection 
of designs, the Copyright Office issued a clarifying regulation in which the 
separability test was explicitly stated for the first time. 19 The separability 
test, now codified in the current Copyright Act, was expressed in the Copy-
right Office's regulations as follows: 
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact 
that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it 
as a work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article 
incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or picto-
rial representation, which can be identified separately and are 
capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features 
will be eligible for registration. 20 
The separability test was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer. 21 In Esquire, 
the court considered whether the Register of Copyrights, in refusing to 
16. u.s. COPYRIGHT OFFICE. RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS TO 
COPYRIGHT § 12(g) (1909). reprinted in A. WElL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 625 
(1917). 
17. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1948). 
18. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
19. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1959). 
20. Id. 
21. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied. 440 U.S. 908 (1978). 
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register designs of outdoor lighting fixtures, had adopted a permissible 
interpretation of the regulation. The court agreed with the Register's view 
that Congress, in enacting the Copyright Act of 1909, adopted a policy 
against copyrighting industrial designs. The Register's reading of section 
202.1O(c) was characterized by the Esquire court as "a reasonable and well-
supported interpretation.'>22 The interpretation was held to reflect both 
administrative expertise and consistent application. 23 
. More recently, the Eleventh Circuit applied the separability test and 
agreed with ·the Copyright Office that the design of a wire wheel cover did 
not qualify as a work of art since there were no artistic features that could 
exist independently of the useful article. 24 
Two district court cases also sharply iIlustrate the dividing line 
between utilitarian objects entitled to copyright protection and those objects 
not entitled. In Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft CO.,25 copyright was accorded 
only to the design encasing a pencil sharpener and not to the entire useful 
article. The court in Silvercraft held: "It is crucial at this point to make clear 
that the copyrighted article is the simulation of an antique telephone, not the 
pencil sharpener inside, and not the combination of the twO.,,26 Conse-
quently, the overall shape of an attractive, useful article-a pencil sharp-
ener-could not be copyrighted. In SCOA Industries. Inc. v. Farnolare. 
Inc.,27 the Copyright Office refused to register a claim to copyright a series 
of wavy lines produced on a shoe sole because they were not separable. The 
court held there was no infringement where a competitor merely incorpo-
rated those wavy lines into its shoe soles. 28 
In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl. Inc.,29 the Second Circuit 
considered the question of whether handcrafted belt buckles containing 
sculptured designs were copyrightable. As the court admitted, the issue 
presented was "on a razor's edge of copyright law,"3o The Kieselstein-Cord 
court applied the separability test differently from any other court. The 
court recognized that the belt buckles were registered by the Copyright 
Office as jewelry, and the Office has considered artistic jewelry to be copy-
rightable as works of art since 1948.31 In holding the belt buckles to be 
copyrightable, the Kieselstein-Cord court found the design formed on the sur-
face of the buckles to be a conceptually separate design. 32 In summation, 
22. [d. at 800. 
23. [d. at 804-05. 
24. Norris Indus .• Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp .• 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.). cert. 
denied. 464 U.S. 81 8 (1983). 
25. 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
26. [d. at 734. 
27. 192 U.S.P.Q. (DNA) 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
28. [d. 
29. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). 
30. /d. at 990. 
31. [d. at 993; see also Warner. Copyrighting Jewelry. 31 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 487 (1949). 
32. Kieselstein-Cord. 632 F.2d at 993. In the same sense. a design on wallpaper "or a floral 
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the court held that the Copyright Office implicitly considered the belt buck-
les in question to contain a copyrightable work of art. 33 . 
III. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE SEPARABILITY TEST 
As described in the House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976,34 for an 
applied design to be copyrightable, the artistic features must not only be sepa-
rate, but must also be capable of an independent existence. This separation 
and independence can be either 'physical or conceptual. In either case, the test 
for determining copyrightability of an applied design can be restated this way: 
(I) It must be possible to perceive a fully functioning useflJl article, with its 
basic, overall shape intact, which is able to exist even if one were to remove 
certain features; and (2) those separate, artistic features must themseives meet 
the Copyright Act's minimal standard of original creative expression. 35 Irrele-
vant to the application of this test are such factors as the aesthetic value of the 
design, whether the shape could be designed differently, and the amount of 
work which went into the creation 'of the design. 36 . 
The Copyright Office now has more than thirty years experience in 
applying the separability test. The test is both reasonable anct workable. 
The task of differentiating between designs' protected by copyright law and 
those unprotected is a difficult one in borderline cases. This, however, 
would be true of any alternative test. The separability test has also func-
tioned as a barrier to protection of indus~rial designs in general. As noted 
in the 1976 House Report, industrial products-such as furniture, televi-
sion sets, automobiles, appliances, and the like-which are at least in part 
designed to be aesthetically pleasing, are not protected under the copyright 
law by application of the separability test. 37 
The separability test is criticized by some writers and designers because 
the test works to exclude functional modern designs rather than to include 
meritorious, artistic efforts. In the early development of the separability test, 
the Copyright Office was more concerned with this drawback of the test than 
relief design on silver flatware" is considered separable. See H.R. REP. No. 1476. 94th 
Cong .• 2d Sess. 55 (1976). 
33. Kieselstein-Cord. 632 F.2d at 994. 
34. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
35. For example. the wavy pattern on the soles in SCOA Indus .• Inc. v. Famolare. Inc .• 192 
US.P.Q. (BNA) 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) would not have been copyrightable even if consid-
ered conceptually separable from the shape of the useful article. since the wavy pattern 
was not sufficiently original and creative. See ".R. REP. No. 1476. 94th Cong .• 2d Sess. 
54-55. reprinted in 1976 US. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659.5667-68. 
36. US. COPYRIGHT OFFICE. COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 505.05 
(1984). Section 505.05 provides as follows: 
Separability test: factors not relevant in determining registrability. In applying 
the test of separability. the following are· not relevant considerations: 
I) the aesthetic value of the design. 2) the fact that the shape could be designed 
differently. or 3) the amount of work which went into the making of the design. 
Thus. the mere fact that a famous designer produces a uniquely shaped food 
processor does not render the design of the food processor copyrightable. 
37. ".R. REP. No. 1476. 94th Cong .• 2d Sess. 55 (1976). 
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in recent years. Testifying in favor of the Design Protection Act of 1960, Mr. 
Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights, agonized over the unfairness of the test 
to modern functional design. In his testimony, Register Fisher stressed that 
modern use of designs was being denied copyright protection. In his opin-
ion, this was a completely illogical result. 38 Register Fisher's words contrast 
sharply with the recommendation by the 1976 House Subcommittee to the 
Copyright Office to incorporate the separability test in explicit statutory lan-
guage. 
Judicial acceptance of the separability test certainly has contributed to 
its credibility. Time and experience have also allowed the Copyright Office 
to become more assured in its application of the test. The fundamental issue 
remaining is whether the copyright laws should be stretched to accommo-
date aesthetically pleasing designs, or whether an objective test, such as the 
separability test, should be applied to foreclose copyright protection of most 
designs. The Copyright Office has concluded that the latter course is correct 
because of the statutory language in support of that position. 39 The practi-
cal effect of this approach is that most applied designs are not protected by 
copyright nor are they effectively protected by the design patent law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Application of the separability test means that the basic design of any 
utilitarian article is not protected by copyright. Products containing a two-
dimensional design-for example, floral pattern on dinnerware or 
38. See Design Protection: Hearings on S. 2075 and S. 2852 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks & Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 
81-82 (1960). Register Fisher's testimony read as follows: 
Id. 
What we are trying to do is take an artistic form of art or representation of 
art, such as the Balinese dancers, and there we are issuing certificates [of copy-
right registration]. 
As the opposite extreme, the contemporary, modern use of the best 
designs of often more beautiful art which is not representational, we are not reg-
istering. We think this is a wholly illogical position, frankly-I confess this in 
open hearing-to say that on a piece of furniture an elk head on the back of a 
bench is subject to registration because our grandfathers had elk heads on their 
benches, and a modern contemporary design for a piece of furniture by the 
Miller Co. of Michigan which represents the most modern, most beautiful 
design is not registerable. Or similarly a picture on a plate which is of flowers 
or forest or an animal is protected, but a more beautiful piece of Swedish or 
Danish chinaware designed for example, by George Jensen, and which might 
appear in a museum is not registerable. 
We think this is a wholly questionable position. As a result, we are being 
sued with increasing frequency, and there is a great deal of time and money in 
my office and that of the Attorney General being spent in trying to sustain this 
illogical line in the hope that we will be relieved of this by Congress. This is 
what we are trying to do. 
We don't like it a bit, and I spend much of my time, as the Librarian said, 
on something which is really foreign to the basic purposes of copyright. 
39. See 17 U.S.C. § lOl (1988). 
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flatware-are generally protected, but only with respect to the two-dimen-
sional design. The greatest impact of the separability test has been in the 
case of the three-dimensional design of articles of utility. Relatively few of 
these designs can pass the separability test, and virtually no modern, func-
tional design can pass the test. 
Finally, it is important to understand that the separability test is not 
applied unless some part of the work can be classified as a useful article. 
The separability test is never applied to works that fall within the traditional 
concept of works of art-for example, paintings, sculptures, and graphic 
prints-which have no purpose other than to be appreciated aesthetically. 
At the same time, acceptance of an object for display in an art museum does 
not make that object a work of art under copyright law. If the article has a 
useful aspect within the meaning of copyright law, the separability test 
would then be applied. 
